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This essay frames systemic patterns of mental abuse against women of color and Indigenous 
women on Turtle Island (North America) in terms of larger design-of-distribution strategies in 
settler colonial societies, as these societies use various forms of social power to distribute, 
reproduce, and automate social inequalities (including public health precarities and mortality 
disadvantages) that skew socioeconomic gain continuously toward white settler populations and 
their descendants. It departs from traditional studies in gender-based violence research that frame 
mental abuses such as gaslighting—commonly understood as mental manipulation through lying 
or deceit—stochastically, as chance-driven, interpersonal phenomena. Building on structural 
analyses of knowledge in political epistemology (Dotson 2012a; Berenstain 2016), political theory 
(Davis and Ernst 2017), and Indigenous social theory (Tuck and Yang 2012), I develop the notion 
of cultural gaslighting to refer to the social and historical infrastructural support mechanisms that 
disproportionately produce abusive mental ambients in settler colonial cultures in order to further 
the ends of cultural genocide and dispossession. I conclude by proposing a social epidemiological 
account of gaslighting that a) highlights the public health harms of abusive ambients for minority 
populations, b) illuminates the hidden rules of social structure in settler colonial societies, and  
c) amplifies the corresponding need for structural reparations.   
 
___________________________________________________ 
 
 
To be an Indigenous woman in this country is to intimately understand both interpersonal 
and systemic gaslighting 
—Emily Riddle (nehiyaw iskwew) 
 
  
The term gaslighting comes from the title of a 1944 film adaptation of Patrick Hamilton’s 1938 
play, which portrays the manipulative attempts of a jewel thief to take possession of his wife’s 
riches through a wide range of acts designed to pathologize her as insane, including lies, isolation, 
double-talk, and duplicitously restaging household objects. It gained popularity in Anglo-
American psychology throughout the 1980s and 90s as a popular-culture heuristic for addressing 
emotional abuse sustained in intimate partnerships (see, for example, Kutcher 1982; Cawthra, 
O'Brien, and Hassanyeh 1987). This framing bracketed the film’s original references to the 
physical violence (the murder of his wife’s aunt) required for the gaslighter to gain access to his 
wife’s home and the specific power relation to her psychic life as her husband. Isolated from its 
structural connection to other forms of violence, gaslighting came to be known as an interpersonal 
abuse mechanism or pressure tactic that enables abusers to get inside the heads of their intended 
victims for the purposes of asserting power and/or establishing control.<2> The term continues to 
have this distinctly mentalistic and interpersonal meaning in modern colloquial usage and in 
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psychology, where it is defined as “the effort of one person to undermine another person’s 
confidence and stability by causing the victim to doubt [their] own sense and beliefs” (Kline 2006, 
quoted in Davis and Ernst 2017, 2).  
I argue that gaslighting is a structural phenomenon that upholds interpersonal and institutional 
modes of mental abuse in settler colonial societies; it is not merely a generalized human trait of 
psychological susceptibility. Rather, it is a technique of violence that produces asymmetric harms 
for different populations depending on one’s processive relation to/within settler social structures. 
To show this, I take a social epidemiological approach that focuses on population-wide health 
inequities alongside Indigenous perspectives on health, self-determination, and colonial violence 
(Acuña Delgado 2006; Tuck and Yang 2012; Jones et al. 2013; Ngāti Awa et al. 2013; Cameron 
et al. 2019). I employ anticolonial perspectives on population health inequity that shift the 
momentum away from probabilistic accounts of life chances (as socially structured for all humans) 
to more coordinated views of social inequity based on nonaccidental maldistribution of harm.<3> 
On this view, at its broadest level, gaslighting is a way of curating modalities of resistance to settler 
colonial cultures for the purposes of consolidating the colonial project of Indigenous land 
dispossession and cultural genocide of non-Euro-Atlantic peoples. At its narrowest, it is a pointed 
aim at the inner life of experiences of settler violence. On both accounts, it enacts violence, not 
moral evaluative accounts of violence as an epistemic phenomenon.  
Because keeping oppressed peoples in the dark about the social formation of psychological 
toolkits for understanding violence is a cultural, counterrevolutionary strategy designed to 
manipulate social understanding of colonial violence and its structural prevalence, the greatest 
success of the gaslighting paradigm is that it provides cover for the structural dimensions of 
gaslighting. This idea will be examined through the notion of settler innocence narratives 
(Mawhinney 1998; Tuck and Yang 2012) and the political demands that decoding these projects 
make on people living in what is commonly referred to, following the 1848 secession of over half 
a million miles on the southwestern border, as “US territory.” Focusing on the structural 
functionalization of settler moves to innocence, I argue that there is nothing accidental about the 
popularization of the narrowed psychological understanding of gaslighting as interpersonal, 
emotional abuse. For example, in a 2017 Psychology Today article, the following list was provided 
as a diagnostic for gaslighting: 
  
1) They tell blatant lies; 2) they deny they ever said something, even though you have 
proof; 3) they use what is near and dear to you as ammunition; 4) they wear you down 
over time; 5) their actions do not match their words; 6) they throw in positive 
reinforcement to confuse you; 7) they know confusion weakens people; 8) they project; 
9) they try to align people against you; 10) they tell you or others that you are crazy; 11) 
they tell you everyone else is a liar. (Sarkis 2017) 
  
Settler colonial culture does, in fact, tell blatant lies, deny in the face of proof, use the near and 
dear against you, wear you down over time . . . at face value, the notion of gaslighting can all too 
easily be used as a diagnostic tool to refer to the effort of one culture to undermine another 
culture’s confidence and stability by causing the victimized collective to doubt [its] own sense and 
beliefs. By decoupling intersecting structural violences from their original portrayal and containing 
the source of violence within the isolated consciousness of individuals, the notion of gaslighting 
as interpersonal, emotive harm works to foreclose awareness of ongoing cultural processes through 
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organized failures of understanding. These failures are functionalized through vast networks of 
settler institutions, social policies, and publicly licensed resources of interpretation.   
This is a common move in settler epistemologies. Weak concepts are presented as robust 
frameworks for analysis that are then laid before oppressed peoples as offerings, keys to insights 
about what is happening to one, but that 1) reinforce the cultural assumptions behind settler 
epistemologies and 2) often have to be rebuilt wholesale to even begin to approximate the 
complexity of harm and violence experienced in settler states such as the US, Canada, and Mexico. 
This epistemic labor is done frequently and at great cost. Meanwhile, robust accounts of 
multistable structural violences (such as those produced by women of color and Indigenous 
philosophers on Turtle Island) are devalued, testimonially suppressed, and “quieted” in settler 
cultures, as Kristie Dotson’s work on epistemic oppression has powerfully shown (see, for 
example, Dotson 2011; 2012;  2013; 2014a; 2014b; 2017). Gaslighting, on this account, is a settler 
conceptual ruse that diverts critical attention away from structural epistemic oppressions that 
continue to underwrite the colonial project.<4> One example of this is reductive accounts of 
medical gaslighting.  
 
 
MEDICAL GASLIGHTING 
 
Medical gaslighting is commonly understood as the interpersonal phenomenon of having one’s 
experience of illness marginalized (including having one’s self-reported or presenting symptoms 
downplayed, silenced, or psychologically manipulated) by a clinical provider or healthcare 
professional.<5> This view developed from the use of gaslighting to denote coercive control in 
interpersonal violence research (Stark 2007; Roberts and Andrews 2013; Johnson et al. 2017; 
Harris and Woodlock 2019, 530–32) and jettisoned structural accounts available in health equity 
research on racism (see, for example, Washington 2007; Hoffman et al. 2016; Bailey et al. 2017; 
Browne 2017; Goodman et al. 2017).<6> The latter identify a wide range of micro-, meso-, and 
more important, macro-level phenomena that work to promote structural oppressions, including 
cases of legal gaslighting (Epstein and Goodman 2019) that functionalize coercive social power to 
continuously downplay women’s experiences of intersectional oppressions as we navigate public 
institutions. These structural literatures emphasize that psychological stressors have real-life harms 
that certainly include individual tolls, yet also pose significant intergenerational, intragenerational, 
and historical group consequences that not all social groups face. What gets lost in the reductive 
interpersonal accounts of medical gaslighting as individualized epistemic injustices is the way 
these harms are consistently and unevenly distributed across specific populations, not by accident, 
but by design.<7> In the next section, we’ll take a look at how this maldistribution persists through 
social transformations in health-care access through US Black women’s reproductive health 
history. A similar point can easily be made for Indo-Mestizx, Afro-Latinx, First Nations, 
Aboriginal, Pacific Islander, Pueblos Originarios, American Indian, and Indigenous women given 
the structural maldistribution of intersectional violences surrounding femicide, forced 
disappearance, rape, and sex- and labor-trafficking in the global economy.<8>  
To begin, the systemic clinical silencing of reported symptoms that marginalize US Black 
women’s reproductive health needs does not happen in a vacuum. Decreases in health care access 
and care quality for Black women are not isolated from gains and increases for other populations. 
This is especially evident in the rise of assisted reproductive technologies (ART), which by design 
amplify the reproductive health concerns of white women. As Camisha Russell explains, these 
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technologies are often mobilized to maintain racialized systems of global inequality, especially 
through racial constructions of infertility and catering services to white women and couples with 
scientifically debunked yet culturally pervasive rhetorics of genetic race (Russell 2018).<9>  In 
1992, congress set up the National ART Surveillance Program (H.R. 2733) to collect data on ART 
patient demographics, obstetric and medical history, procedures and birth outcomes, but not race 
or ethnicity. This led to a bevy of studies attempting to identify the impact of race and ethnicity on 
ART use (not access to); adjusting for the impact of insurance mandates for IVF treatment, one 
recent study looked at a one-year distribution of ART cycles in the US varied by race/ethnicity 
and found “the highest proportion of use occurring among older, college-educated white non-
Hispanic women with incomes >300% above the poverty level,” or “85.5% of cycles, followed by 
Hispanic (5.5%), black non-Hispanic (4.6%), and A/PI non-Hispanic (4.5%) women” (Dieke et al. 
2017).  This approach to racial inequality in ART is reminiscent of the old line, “when someone 
hides something behind a bush and looks for it again in the same place and finds it there as well, 
there is not much to praise in such seeking and finding” (Nietzsche 2009, 257). Social and 
biomedical technologies in settler colonial societies are deeply embedded in power differentials 
that functionalize colonial relations. Indigenous women’s and women of color’s life chances 
through reproduction have been carefully regulated by social policies aligned with economic gains 
for white settler populations since slavery. In fact, racialized labor is so important in a settler-
colonial market economy that it must be seen as unimportant, mystified through pathologizing 
rhetorics of risk-inducing population behaviors or personal choice. As the above study conjectures:  
 
Racial/ethnic disparities in infertility prevalence have been documented and may be due 
to disparities in conditions known to cause infertility such as sexually transmitted 
infections (STIs). For instance, some racial/ethnic minorities report higher rates of STIs 
(including STIs leading to pelvic inflammatory disease) compared with non-Hispanic 
whites. Additionally, delays in accessing infertility care have been described for some 
racial/ethnic groups. For example, Asian/Pacific Islander (A/PI) and black non-Hispanic 
women reported longer durations of infertility and accessed ART at a later age compared 
with white non-Hispanic women. (Dieke et al. 2017, 605) 
 
There are many ways to responsibly account for the incidence of infertility in marginalized 
populations, including histories of forced sterilization, asymmetrical environmental exposure risks 
to heavy metals, organophosphates, BPAs, PCBs, and other contaminants that induce endocrine 
dysfunction and reduce fetal viability—not just in our lifetime, but in our mothers’ and 
grandmothers’ lifetimes. STIs are not an acceptable conjecture in this context.<10> For example, 
uterine fibroids, the leading indication for hysterectomy in the US, are experienced at much higher 
rates and with greater severity by Black women than white women (Stewart et al. 2013, 807). This 
includes an earlier age of onset, such that the very impact of these disparities is borne differently 
(Myles 2013, 2–10). Yet very few medical studies of this exist compared with those for STIs, for 
which national datasets on racial and ethnic minorities are kept (CDC 2015). In her 2018 APA 
talk, “Stem Cell Clinics, Medical Gaslighting, and Epistemic Marginalization,” Nora Berenstain 
emphasizes the role that medical gaslighting plays in producing intersectionally structured harms 
that disproportionately fall on Black women and diminish their reproductive autonomy. She notes, 
“Black women are less likely to have their pain from uterine fibroids taken seriously, and, when it 
is taken seriously, they are more likely to receive recommendations for extreme procedures that 
require long recovery periods and result in sterilization” (Berenstain 2018). Black women receive 
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hysterectomies to treat uterine fibroids at twice the rate that white women with a fibroid diagnosis 
do.<11> This is unsurprising in light of the long colonial history of strategic maldistribution of 
public health precarities and the corresponding gatekeeping of health resources. 
In Medical Apartheid (2007), Harriet Washington details the exploitative history of medical 
experimentation on Black Americans that bedrocked the rise of clinical medicine as a functionally 
white-serving institution and established social baselines for mistrust in doctor–patient interactions 
in the US (Washington 2007). Washington details, for example, the targeted abuse of Black slave 
women by surgeon James Marion Sims (1813–1883), a former president of the American Medical 
Association and founder of the first women’s hospital in the US.  Long considered a figurehead in 
medical advancements in gynecological medicine and surgery, Sims systematically mutilated and 
abused his patients of color, seventeen of whom he acquired as slaves for these purposes. Among 
his many known procedures, he once removed the bladder stones from a nine-year-old slave girl 
in order to create, not close, a vesicovaginal fistula he could study. He routinely anesthetized 
women so their husbands could rape them while “flatly refusing to administer anesthesia to slave 
women and girls,” repeatedly discounting their pain as real or sufficient to warrant intervention on 
account of alleged racial differences in pain tolerance (Washington 2007, 65). In a recent study of 
racial bias in pain management, half of white medical students interviewed in the US study 
believed at least one of the following to be a biological fact: the nerve endings of Black people are 
less sensitive than those of whites, Black people’s skin is thicker than those of whites, Black 
people’s blood coagulates at faster rates than those of whites, among other myths (Hoffman et al. 
2016). The education-to-provider pipeline in US medicine has remained deeply imbedded in the 
colonial project. This includes associated research produced by medical scientists. From an 
anticolonial standpoint, it is unsurprising that the scientific literature on racial discrimination in 
US medicine has been severely restricted in analyses of “structural or systematic racism” (.04% of 
the established literature) when compared to the skyrocketing number of studies (nearly 48,000 in 
2016) that list race neutrally as an objective social factor (Bailey et al. 2017).<12> A shift in 
thinking is needed from conducting “informative studies” on race to analyzing the limits of studies 
that are based on the racist observational economy of Native informancy, the preferred research 
method in settler-credibility economies.  
The impacts of these structured voids in medical knowledge for women of color are not only 
compounded and multiplicative, but also operate across various scales and registers of life. As 
nonaccidental gaps in knowledge, they help justify intersectionally evasive and race-neutral 
explanations for our experiences of structured racism and sexist racism in everyday life.  This 
includes the common view that oppressed peoples see oppression everywhere or “read too much 
into” adverse experiences, even at the doctor’s office, where race-neutral explanations almost 
always produce variants of patient culpability, such as a patient’s alleged failures to report 
clinically significant symptoms or communicate effectively. Noteworthy is that increased presence 
of empirical studies on clinical racism or sexism (as very few studies on systemic sexist racism 
exist) has not closed these gaps, but has often produced the need for follow-up studies to 
empirically demonstrate the inverse—that antiracism and nondiscrimination is statistically 
significant enough to recommend interventions in current conditions. This problem is compounded 
with the common belief that producing compelling scientific research on social inequality will be 
met with corrective action, since empirical evidence is thought to yield the potential to inform 
policy decisions in ways disproportionate to other argumentative strategies in the public sphere. If 
that empirical proof is imperial, yes, easily, because it can be recognized in the design of social 
structure that determines the organization of knowledges in the public sphere: bad science gets 
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used all the time in marshaling corrective measures against people of color, and called out when it 
harms white populations.<13> “Cherry picked racist research,” as Rep. Katherine Clark notes, has 
been used successfully by the Trump administration to rescind civil rights policy aimed at 
dismantling the school-to-prison pipeline for children of color (Brinlee 2019).<14> A systems 
view is essential here because, even if a new administration rescinds the rollback, this pattern 
continues in the prison-to-death pipeline for people of color.<15> One way or another, structured 
precarity remains for some populations but not others.   
This is where new structuralist views of oppression as the coordinated maldistribution of social 
harm come in. Asymmetries in the distribution of lifetime chances to be in need of systems that 
systematize racism is not an accidental phenomenon in settler colonial societies. Settler systems 
need to be needed so they can do their work of structuring power over social structure, whether at 
the level of regulation, enforcement, encoding, respecification, distribution, or surveillance: social 
pathways, punitive or rewarding, are established for this purpose. On this view, the structural 
legacy of medical apartheid continues today despite social transformations aimed at more evenly 
distributing the social goods of civil rights and other settler configurations of judicable goods by 
those in power since the landing of the Mayflower.  
Reductive accounts of medical gaslighting do not capture this reality. Consider that today, 
women of color walking by the South Carolina statehouse, whether en route to receive 
gynecological care or as plaintiffs seeking redress for medical malpractice, must do so under the 
venerated gaze of marble statues dedicated to Sims and his legacy (Washington 2007). Countless 
similar examples exist. What this signals to us a choice by the preservers, not the creators, to 
willfully continue mentally slapping and berating marginalized populations long after empirical 
studies have demonstrated (by publicly legible, settler scientific standards) the adverse health 
consequences and psychophysiological impacts of inhabiting environments that induce stress or 
increase exposure risks, from low birthweights to inflammatory markers linked to cardiac disease 
and likelihood of death from stroke. Settler geoscaping of the environment is thus one form of 
structural gaslighting as mental manipulation and deceit that distributes harms unevenly across 
populations. It offers structural protectives to some individuals by curating public worlds and 
visual languages that venerate white supremacy, normalize sexist racism, and reinforce beliefs of 
color-blind societies, so that when a white person is accused of racism, the allostatic load is often 
less than when a person of color experiences racism.<16> This is a serious social disadvantage. In 
settler colonial societies, public worlds are also epistemic safety nets that extend various layers of 
protection to some people but not others by design. This is not where one arrives in social science 
research. It is where one starts.   
A structural approach to medical gaslighting is helpful here because it illustrates that the 
gaslighting in question is not simply from the presiding clinical provider: a tightly woven net of 
policies, training manuals, advisory boards, disciplinary and institutional procedures—even 
medical equipment—upholds the structured inattention to the reproductive health needs of (to 
follow the previous example) Black women, who continue to have the highest maternal mortality 
rates of any group for which metrics are kept.<17> Black newborns consistently die at twice the 
rate of white newborns, and Black mothers consistently die at three to four times that of whites 
(see Flanders-Stepans 2000; Howell et al. 2013). The math is not hard, the finding already well-
known among women of color. From an anticolonial perspective, it is predictive that positivist 
studies on Black maternal and neonatal mortality rates consistently look to patient culpability or 
group stereotypes of health risks to explain causes of cases, yet draw blanks regarding hypotheses 
for extended etiologic periods of health risks among Black women—why patterns of precarity ebb 
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and flow in measurement metrics, yet, on the long view, continue to persist. The structured 
inattention to the role that racism, white supremacy, and misogynoir (Bailey and Trudy 2018, 762) 
play in producing what are often simply couched as “health disparities” is a form of gaslighting 
that aims at covering over the entrenched relations of patriarchal power and white supremacist 
domination over racialized, gendered populations in a settler context. Colonialism is a long game, 
one where death and mortality are not measured by cases, but by incidences of cases borne 
unevenly across populations. Social epidemiological framings of structural violence can be useful 
because they extend the etiologic period beyond affected cases to historical and structural 
determinants of health, yet they must be methodologically oriented toward nonwhitewashed 
configurations of those histories and structures. Critical epidemiology can be a helpful starting 
point in this regard (see, for example, Braveman 2001; Prussing 2018). In the next section, I turn 
to more structurally nuanced accounts of gaslighting in racial justice literatures that better capture 
the nonaccidental nature of structural violence in settler colonial societies.  
 
 
RACIAL GASLIGHTING 
 
In “Racial Gaslighting,” Angelique Davis and Rose Ernst argue that gaslighting should be 
understood as a structural phenomenon that targets those who resist white supremacy (Davis and 
Ernst 2017). Disambiguating their use of the term from the interpersonal form of psychological 
abuse represented in Gaslight, Davis and Ernst argue racial gaslighting is a better way to think 
about the “macro-level racial spectacles” and other socio-institutional processes that do the behind-
the-scenes work in culture to produce the effects subsequently recognized as psychological 
gaslighting. The whole supports the part, and vice versa, but what drops out of this picture of 
gaslighting is a blameless representation of the operations of power and violence in society. The 
maintenance, upkeep, and regeneration of white supremacy is the true function of gaslighting; it 
is an “enduring process” that kicks in when individuals or groups resist white supremacist 
structures in any form.  
This suggests that racial gaslighting, which Davis and Ernst define as “the political, social, 
economic and cultural process that perpetuates and normalizes a white supremacist reality through 
pathologizing those who resist” (Davis and Ernst 2017, 3), will be especially abusive for women 
of color. Since the functionalization of violence against racialized women is a structural feature of 
colonial violence and settler white supremacy, the normalization of pathologizing narratives 
targeting women of color will be multiplicative and asymmetrical with respect to white women. 
“Just as racial formation rests on the creation of racial projects, racial gaslighting, as a process, 
relies on the production of particular narratives. These narratives are called racial spectacles. 
Racial spectacles are narratives that obfuscate the existence of a white supremacist state power 
structure” (3). Thus, racial spectacles pathologizing women of color will become ubiquitous in 
culture, so much so that the need for intersectional understanding of domination will be routinely 
questioned by progressive movements focused on single-axis social justice projects like white 
feminism and gender-neutral racial justice. The kinds of techniques, tropes, narratives, and 
consequences assailed against women of color who resist will thus differ, as will their visibility 
and public reach. This shows up in prevalent questioning of white women’s mental states as 
problematic while retaining a weak narrative version of ontological respect for them as women (as 
in Dr. Ford’s testimony before the House Judiciary Committee), yet characterizing racialized 
women’s whole being as problematic when their mental states are questioned. The questioning 
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comes from individuals, though also from institutional forms, policies, and procedures. When a 
brown Indo-Mestizx woman is given only the option to check “white” in racial classification 
checkboxes over the course of a lifetime, the cultural objective is clear. When racialized and 
Indigenous women are elected into settler public office with noncompliant, anticolonial agendas, 
the response is predictively swift and all too often fatal.  
Gaslighting, on the view offered here, is not a generalized possibility in interpersonal dynamics 
(based on a universal trait of human psychological susceptibility) actualized by the particular 
intentional states of an individual. Following Davis and Ernst, it is a nonaccidental iterative 
process that functions to co-opt resistance to white supremacy by pathologizing noncompliance. 
But pathologization is not meted out evenly across all social actors. A white, cisgender, upper-
middle-class man who allies himself with progressive racial justice movements, or a similarly 
situated couple who buys a redlined house for a family of color are going to be marked differently 
by racial gaslighting than will the family of color, as will each family member. Davis and Ernst 
outline five of these differences in terms of “portrayal, exposure (or risk), pathologization, 
audience and outcome” (Davis and Ernst 2017, 5). To illustrate this, they cite two legal case studies 
about racial power: Korematsu v. United States (1944) and Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Braden 
(1955). 
Korematsu is the landmark case that unsuccessfully challenged Executive Order 9066 
authorizing the internment of individuals based on Japanese ancestry during World War II. The 
Braden case revolved around Carl and Anne Braden, a white couple charged with sedition 
following the firebombing of a redlined home they purchased for Andrew Wade, a Black man, and 
his family. Analyzing doctrinal decisions in both cases, Davis and Ernst focus on the absurd race-
neutral legal narrative crafted in response to Korematsu’s and Braden’s defenses. They cite the 
following prosecutorial comments from the Braden case transcript: 
  
There is no question of white and colored in this case. There has been no colored man 
indicted. I don’t know why [the defense attorney] . . . wanted to harp on white supremacy 
and all that sort of thing . . . [we] should let this be a milestone in the historic fight of 
America today to stop this evil pitting race against race, white against black, Catholic 
against Protestant, Jew against the Gentile, rich against the poor. (8) 
  
The Braden case used the political narrative of communism, syndicalism, and sedition as a vehicle 
for racial gaslighting. While the Bradens were harmed for their actions through trumped-up 
charges and individualized sentencing to hard labor in a Kentucky prison, the violence done to the 
Wades drops out of the doctrinal history of Braden.<19> Davis and Ernst argue the differential 
portrayal of social actors, the level of exposure in scope (limited to mortal consequences) and 
range (individuals, families, communities), who is meant to be the spectator, and the outcome of 
the violence depends on racial profiles determined by white supremacist structures.   
In the Korematsu case, the Supreme Court majority decision denied Fred Korematsu’s claims 
of civil liberty violations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by arguing racial prejudice 
was not the issue: “what we are dealing specifically with is nothing but an exclusion order” to 
“relocation centers” warranted by national security risks in the midst of an official war (Korematsu, 
224, quoted in Davis and Ernst 2017, 4). The Korematsu decision is peculiar for its ability to 
withstand structural challenges while being repudiated by legal scholars. It has never been 
overturned as a matter of law, making possible the legal basis for indefinite detainment and 
internment of anyone characterized as “enemy aliens” by the US (including the current carceral 
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detainment of migrants and asylum-seekers at the US–Mexico border).  From this, Davis and Ernst 
identify the legal doctrine of stare decisis as a supporting mechanism to racial gaslighting.<20>  
Davis and Ernst develop three features of gaslighting as significant for understanding the 
structural dimensions of psychological oppression under white supremacy that are helpful for this 
project. First, racial gaslighting “offers a way to understand how white supremacy is sustained 
over time,” broadening the etiologic period of colonial harm (3, emphasis added).  Second, it is 
about structural iterative power, since there is a direct and bivalent relationship between “the 
promulgation of these [racial] narratives and the creation of law” (4). Third, it is about function, 
not intent; awareness is “not determinative of whether the process of racial gaslighting is taking 
place” (8). While intent is not necessary under their framing of gaslighting, a closer look at the 
history of settler colonialism with respect to Indigenous peoples enables us to bring intent back 
without the Cartesian trappings of mental egoism that underpin notions of liability in the settler 
legal distinctions between actus reus and mens rea, or act and intent. Describing cultural intent 
will also help situate gaslighting as a settler epistemic tool that structurally quiets (Dotson 2012a) 
critical analyses of settler structural violence in order to mitigate cultural liability for settler 
colonial violence and its continuing project of dispossession.<21> The orienting goal of settler 
colonial violence, it must be repeated, is not cultural or racial domination for domination’s sake, 
but to maintain control over production, accumulation, and transmission channels that secure 
intergenerational wealth for white settler populations and their descendants.  
 
 
SETTLER MOVES TO INNOCENCE 
  
The notion of racial gaslighting is critically important but ultimately insufficient for addressing 
the social and historical infrastructural support mechanisms that disproportionately produce 
abusive mental ambients for people of color and Indigenous peoples in settler colonial cultures. 
This is because, although it correctly identifies the persistence of white supremacy, the facilitating 
violences—those that have made white supremacy a viable historical project that functions in 
particular ways and for specific ends—remain unaccounted for. These violences are the techniques 
of settler colonial dispossession. “Techniques” here refers to the various encoding functions of a 
social practice (like sexist racism) that determine ordering, permutation, and synchronicity with 
other social practices, not its metaphysical existence as a particular entity. “Dispossession” refers 
to long-term strategic processes (including various projects of racialization) developed by white 
Anglo-European settlers to irrevocably take possession of Native Amerindian lands. 
Dispossession is a cultural project of epistemic consolidation that requires foresight into 
counterrevolutionary strategy and cooptation of resistant cultural narratives, such as Native claims 
to settler possession of stolen lands and political formations of identity that challenge settler 
colonial authority. The land cannot simply be seen as being owned by settlers; it must be seen as 
the natural and ontological property of whiteness on territory whose history also naturally begins 
with settlement and a founding story of fathers birthing a nation. The world-building 
epistemological function of gaslighting is, by default, to produce totalizing and abusive 
ambients—languages, stories, buildings, practices, rituals, forms and documents—that work to 
destroy resistance to settler cultural authority as natural claims to Indigenous land. For these 
reasons, racial gaslighting analyses of “relocation centers” in the US, such as those derived from 
the Korematsu decision, that do not attend to the forced relocations and violent internment of 
Native Amerindians on government reservations and residential schools (in the US, Canada, but 
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also Mexico and other settler nations (Gott 2007; Speed 2017) can easily perpetuate colonial 
narratives about settlers as first peoples (Deloria and Lytle 1998). 
In “Decolonization is not a Metaphor,” Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang issue a timely warning about 
uncritically collapsing progressive struggles for racial justice with Indigenous projects of 
decolonization: “In our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the 
repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always 
already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically” 
(Tuck and Yang 2012, 7). Collapsing these struggles is one way, according to them, that “the 
settler, disturbed by her own settler status, tries to escape or contain the unbearable searchlight of 
complicity” (9). They refer to such attempts to elude psychological liability as “settler moves to 
innocence” (9).<22> More specifically, “settler moves to innocence are those strategies or 
positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility without giving 
up land or power or privilege, or without having to change much at all” (10). There is thus a distinct 
material function tied to the psychological motivations behind moves to innocence: keeping 
various forms of settler-accumulated wealth, including power and privilege. This is important 
because it links individual moves to innocence to a larger social group or historical collective, as 
in those for whom giving up inherited wealth in the form of land, power, or privilege proves 
difficult. This is not a psychological trait—the hesitancy to give up this power, whether by 
individuals or collectives, does not happen in a vacuum. Underlying supporting mechanisms of 
settler social structures enable it.<23>  
We can extend the notion of settler moves to innocence from individual persons to social groups 
that promote cultural moves to innocence through monopolizing the structural resources of 
institutional patterning and distribution design, where the “strategies” or “positionings” of settler 
cultures that Tuck and Yang allude to are refracted in the very institutional enforcement of social 
structure. In other words, it’s far more than personal bias or racial spectacle at play here. It’s the 
structuring of conditions for ongoing racial spectacles from one generation to another, or to pre-
structured cycles of mobilization without emancipation that are functionalized in various ways 
through settler social structures.<24> On this view, culturally structured epistemic mobilization is 
always coordinated to obstruct emancipation in any meaningful, life-changing way for 
marginalized peoples at the level of populations. Things do get better, for some, for a time.<25> 
But the long game of colonialism does not have freedom as a basic condition of our lives. It won’t 
simply be given. That doesn't mean it won’t be had.   
One of the take-aways from the rich literature on dispossession is the notion of indomitable 
resistance to oppression, including histories of resurgence, reclamation, and refusal (Simpson 
2007; 2014). Another is that people make settler moves to innocence because they can, but that 
this can-do-ness is always structured in advance. It is enabled and reinforced by the physical lands 
and environments around us, and what’s been done to them. Psychological violences are not 
psychological all the way down. Feeling guilty about past and current wrongs feels good when 
your everyday proximate relations to places, practices, and peoples have been actively curated to 
confirm your innocence narrative—when you sense you don’t have to give anything tangible up 
to say you feel this way, especially in triangulation with whiteness, stolen accumulated wealth, or 
settler futurity. In fact, you can potentially profit from moves to innocence by being recognized as 
the one to name the episteme surrounding power and injustice (as Gayatri Spivak’s criticism of 
Foucault holds [Spivak’s 1988]), so long as actual colonial injustices go untracked in the 
episteme.<26> So there’s really not much you have to give up to both recognize this very wrong 
and profit from it, yet in the process also help maintain the inequitable distribution of access to 
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resources tied to social power. It’s settler gold. It simultaneously functionalizes and normalizes the 
social visibility of mobilization without structural emancipation in the domain of knowledge—
what could possibly be better for a settler-credibility economy? It makes it look like folks are really 
trying to help us, and we’re just overly demanding or unreasonable in our resistance to white 
supremacy and its white feminist allies in philosophy. In the next section I’ll illustrate this point 
by looking to the proliferation of hermeneutic injustice discourses in white feminisms in 
philosophy. To do this, I draw on the notion of epistemic exploitation (Berenstain 2016) and 
Dotson’s notion of metaphilosophical apostasy (Dotson 2019).  
 
 
EPISTEMIC EXPLOITATION 
 
Tuck and Yang’s use of settler innocence builds on Janet Mawhinney’s and Mary Louise Fellows 
and Sherene Razack’s examination of white activists’ “strategies to remove involvement in and 
culpability for systems of domination” in their role with antiracist organizations (Tuck and Yang 
2012, 9; see Fellows and Razack 1998; Mawhinney 1998). Fellows and Razack refer to settler 
innocence as a temporal race to get to the finish line first, so to speak, in the self-identification 
with oppression—a “race to innocence” that provides an allegory for “the process through which 
a woman comes to believe her own claim of subordination is the most urgent, and that she is 
unimplicated in the subordination of other women” (9). On this view, by claiming to have an 
“absence of experience,” one can place themselves in the position to ask others to perform labor 
they are creating a new need for. This idea is elaborated at length by Berenstain. Her article, 
Epistemic Exploitation, theorizes epistemic exploitation as a tool of epistemic oppression in which 
dominant populations structurally elicit redundant epistemic and emotional labor from 
marginalized groups by constantly calling on them to explain and educate them about the nature 
of their oppression (Berenstain 2016). The “absence of experience” on which the race to innocence 
hinges is a rhetorical mechanism used to produce epistemic exploitation, manifested as a 
constantly recreated need for an ever-expanding amount of labor from Indigenous peoples and 
people of color to white settler populations. The production of epistemic exploitation via settler 
moves to innocence constitutes part of the practice of epistemic consolidation through the 
disappearing of violences, a form of cultural gaslighting that is necessary for the survival of the 
ongoing settler project.<27>  
Epistemic exploitation functions as a settler form of cultural gaslighting across many fields of 
knowledge, from cultural anthropology to Anglo-European academic philosophy.<28> Here I 
consider the latter, which, following Dotson’s rich notion of metaphilosophical apostasy in Anglo-
American analytic philosophy (Dotson 2019), might also possibly be called philopséma, as in the 
love of structured untruths as a way of journeying toward a particular cultural form of truth. It may 
come as a surprise to some to learn that the knowledge projects of the discipline of academic 
philosophy have always been deeply aligned with colonial and settler colonial epistemic agendas. 
Locke’s account of property, for instance, was explicitly oriented toward providing ontological 
justification for the removal of Indigenous peoples from their ancestral homelands using culturally 
arbitrary conceptions of labor and ownership. While ruling out Indigenous knowledges as 
knowledge, academic philosophy also forecloses on possibilities for the expansion of what is 
recognized as knowledge. One way that academic philosophy doubles down on the European 
colonial subject’s self-declared monopoly on knowledge production is through its structured use 
of epistemic exploitation. Dotson, for example, identifies academic philosophy’s culture of 
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justification as a way for narrow conceptions of philosophical “rigor” to function as gatekeepers 
to disciplinary legitimacy. Dotson reflects on how philosophy’s culture of justification creates a 
hostile and unsustainable environment for diverse practitioners who may work on issues that 
acknowledge the relevance and reality of social location and embodied experience: 
 
The burden of shifting justifying norms within a professional environment that manifests 
symptoms of a culture of justification involves sacrificing one’s labor and energies 
towards providing a catalyst for change via numerous legitimating narratives aimed at 
gaining positive status for oneself as a philosopher and one’s projects as philosophical. 
Let me make the strong statement that shouldering this burden and the set of experiences 
one exposes oneself to is not a livable option for many would-be diverse practitioners of 
philosophy and the small numbers of under-represented populations within professional 
philosophy attest to this observation. (Dotson 2012b, 15) 
 
Annika Mann describes similar experiences in which she must respond to others’ incredulity and 
doubt that her work really counts as philosophy: 
  
My struggle has been trying to figure out ways to bring my blackness and my femaleness 
together with philosophy and to find acceptance of such philosophical work within the 
academy. I think that most departments, to be honest, give lip service to this kind of 
acceptance. “Yes, we’d love to have someone come here to do African American 
philosophy. We’d love someone to come and do feminist philosophy and try to bridge 
these gaps.” But when you actually come and say, “OK, this is what I’m going to do,” 
then you get, “What philosophy do you really do?” Or, “What classes can you really 
teach?” The implication becomes, “What within the mainstream western canon can you 
really do?” And that is very frustrating to me. And I think it serves to further marginalize 
the work that I am trying to do. (Allen et al. 2008) 
  
Making diverse philosophical practitioners first prove that what they do should count as 
philosophy is an effective management strategy for quelling 1) the development of insurrectionist 
knowledges and 2) the intergenerational preservation of ancestral know-how and Indigenous 
philosophies that contributes to the collective continuance of a people (Whyte 2018). Marginalized 
knowledge-creators must devote their time and cognitive resources to proving the legitimacy of 
our ideas by demonstrating that they are at the very least adjacent to and comprehensible within 
recognizable settler epistemic frameworks. This epistemic “pay to play” requirement for certain 
populations ensures that our resources and labor are depleted, extracted, and expended on 
meaningless pretheoretical busywork before we are able to pursue our own counterrevolutionary 
epistemic strategies, such as trust-busting the epistemic consolidation project of the self-declared 
settler monopoly on knowledge production.  
The ontological project of settler colonialism involves reifying the settler presence on stolen 
lands as original and timeless, which provides an illusory justification for governance through the 
“policing” of who belongs there. This logic is similarly played out via the settler policing of who 
belongs in the proper place of the colonial discipline of academic philosophy. The culture of 
justification positions dominant colonial epistemologies as the truest, most original, and default 
forms of knowledge and positions their foot soldiers as the gatekeepers of legitimacy within the 
ivory tower. As Dotson identifies, the use of “legitimating narratives” that are differentially 
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deployed against racialized populations functions as a “boundary policing” mechanism, essentially 
creating a porous border to the discipline that is reified and enforced through diffuse cultural 
practices. These material differences are made possible by a structured accumulation of epistemic 
power (Dotson 2018b) that helps generate cultures of salience oriented toward epistemic 
apostleship, not the deep critical thought often claimed by the discipline (Dotson 2019).   
Another example of colonial epistemic practices of legitimating narratives can be found in how 
colonial nations structure the institution of gender-based asylum. Ezgi Sertler demonstrates how 
these institutions are structured to foreclose on applicants’ knowledge while reifying the power of 
state actors. She writes, “this structural limit becomes visible when we realize how the institution 
of asylum is formed to provide legitimacy to the institutional comfort the respective migration 
courts and boards enjoy.” Sertler introduces the important notion of “institutional comfort” to 
describe “the ways in which state actors in migration courts and boards are systemically afforded 
the ability to arbitrarily and ambiguously misinterpret asylum applicants’ experiences, cultures, 
and countries” (Sertler 2018, 5). Epistemic assumptions and norms are structurally tipped in favor 
of the credibility of state actors at the expense of applicant credibility. This manifests in migration 
boards’ freedom and ability to dismiss credible reports of violence, danger, and threat by asylum-
seekers and structurally reframe them as noncredible. If applicants’ reports about their experiences 
in their home countries do not fit with the dominant narratives and representations of their 
countries under the colonial gaze, this provides a reason for their reports to be dismissed as 
suspicious and unfounded.  
For instance, Sertler considers the case of Sara, a Kurdish woman in Iraq whose family had 
arranged for her to be married against her will. After she began a secret relationship with a 
colleague, her brother caught them and retaliated violently. When Sara went to the police, the 
officer “told her he would have killed her himself had she been his sister, and that the police could 
not do anything since it was an honour-related crime’” (9). The Migration Board dismissed Sara’s 
application based on a failure to find her credible. Specifically, the Board suggested that “it is odd 
and not very likely that she would initiate a sexual relation with another man when she knows she 
is going to marry her cousin. . . . That she would be so blinded by love and disregard the 
consequences is not a reasonable explanation with the culture that is prevalent in northern Iraq and 
with her family traditions in mind” (9). Because Sara’s experience did not fit the Board’s 
strategically uninformed and actively ignorant conception of Kurdish women’s lives and “the 
culture” in northern Iraq, her claims about her own experience were dismissed as unreliable. On 
this view, Sara did not simply run up against some bad epistemic luck with the Board, or fall on 
the mortal end of an unvirtued interpersonal judgment based on a structural identity prejudice 
about Kurdish women, migrants, and asylum seekers that, as darn historical luck would have it, 
belonged to western culture at the time she sought relief.  
On one view, the Migration Board’s treatment of Sara is an example of the gaslighting that 
occurs “where a listener doesn’t believe, or expresses doubt about, a speaker’s testimony. In this 
epistemic form of gaslighting, the hearer of testimony raises doubts about the speaker’s reliability 
at perceiving events accurately” (McKinnon 2017, 168). Seen in the broader context of colonial 
relations, this practice also exemplifies the very condition of Native informancy that forms part of 
the conditions of cultural gaslighting in colonial contexts, where the standards for believability of 
oppressed peoples shift, change, multiply, and are always asymmetrically held in the 
hermeneutical contexts of settler colonial culture (which is always tacitly positioned as 
Hearer). Intake forms, institutional policies, operational practices, social reward mechanisms, and 
official incentives for survival are developed alongside the violences that produce the condition of 
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Native informancy to ensure that who “speaks” and who “hears” is subordinate to the cultural 
interpretive mechanisms that legitimate speech, meaning, and intelligibility—not what is said, but 
what is sayable through the licensed languages that precondition the possibility of being 
understood in settler colonial culture (Ruíz 2012). 
The move to decouple structural and identity prejudices (even while retaining a formal 
conceptual relation between them) is linked to the functionalization of innocence narratives that 
enable blame to be placed on the precariously knowable intentional mental states of individual 
social actors who simply followed the functionally legitimated scripts of colonial violence and 
dispossession. Some philosophers have responded to this by proposing different forms of bias 
training, including cultivating virtued reflective attitudes that open the way for more just epistemic 
practices between us. But virtued liberal narratives and reflective practices have always been 
designed to functionally coexist with oppressive realities. To whom, exactly, is this news? And 
they have been designed this way since Aristotle theorized virtue alongside the justified 
enslavement of nonwhite peoples, and neo-Aristotelianism was functionalized in the colonial 
project as the baseline to justify the freedom of enslaved peoples as those possessing western self-
reflective Reason, or have we not read these edicts and papal bulls? Only in a settler credibility 
economy that trades in the social recognition of mobilization without emancipation can one make 
sense of the fact that as of 2019, Korematsu is still good law while having been formally overruled: 
good law legally, not rhetorically; it is what is currently allowing the carceral internment of 
asylum-seekers and children as a matter of law. Jamal Greene argues that the Supreme Court’s 5–
4 majority decision in Trump v. Hawaii, which claimed to finally overrule Korematsu, is thus an 
“empty and grotesque” claim, empty because it is not binding on lower courts, and grotesque 
because “its emptiness means to conceal its disturbing affinity with that case” (Greene 2019, 629). 
This is what epistemic injustice literatures in white feminisms can feel like for people of color who 
have long had to consider the relation between social knowledge and the colonial project. In the 
next section, we’ll see how hermeneutic injustice should thus be understood as a form of 
hermeneutic violence, not the other way around. This is because the possible epistemes for 
understanding knowledge, truth, credibility, and testimony are often the result of hermeneutical 
whitewashing and other forms of prestructural violence, including epistemicides, that yield 
accumulated forms of cultural interpretive power—the gearwork behind cultural gaslighting.  
 
 
PRESTRUCTURAL VIOLENCE 
  
Hermeneutic violence is a unique kind of cultural violence that arose in conjunction with the 
colonial projects of western European powers. It is violence done to systems of meaning and 
significance for the purposes of weakening resistance to colonization and securing the 
dispossession of Native lands and resources (Ruíz 2013; 2019). It ensures that the bodies that 
continue to survive colonial genocide are displaced from a tacit network of referential systems that 
weave meaning together independently of settler colonial epistemologies. It is a prestructural 
violence that includes violence to calendrical systems, narrative textiles like amoxtli, the treaty-
stealing and polluting of lands, rivers, and waterways, but also trauma done to traditional kinship 
structures and nonbinary understandings of sex and gender. On the long view, it can include 
epigenetic violences that disproportionately induce genetic risks in some populations but not others 
and force communities to reconfigure the emplaced role of our bodies and communal health under 
conditions of structured precarity and deficiency narratives.  
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For Native Amerindians, the forced, violent imposition of the western alphabet and subject-
predicate grammar (as well as the assumptions of exclusionary logic, interiorization, and narrative 
linearity that support it) constituted a unique violence to the discursive practices of Indigenous 
communities that very often goes unacknowledged. By weakening the relationship between Native 
Amerindians and the interpretive resources required to effectively participate in cultural processes, 
one powerful consequence of hermeneutic violence has been the degree of difficulty contemporary 
Indigenous women face in having claims of violence heard and recognized in one’s home language 
(Ruíz 2013; 2019). The prestructural machinations of these hermeneutic violences are essential 
conditions for the contemporary forms of cultural gaslighting that are a cornerstone of settler 
epistemic practices. Cultural gaslighting often turns on the active disappearing of the prestructural 
hermeneutic violences that formed the conditions of possibility for settler society. On the usual 
view, European colonizers “imposed” their worldview onto Native Amerindians as either an 
intentional act of domination or as an unintended consequence of encountering a radically different 
culture, which caused colonizers to revert to their default cultural understandings without insight 
into the limits of their epistemic frameworks. This cultural narrative of presumed unintentionality 
has enabled settler interpretive resources to accumulate epistemic power (Dotson 2018b), which 
further enables settler epistemologies to foreclose revolutionary and insurgent resistance. This is 
an epistemic spectacle we must refuse.  
In political theory, and particularly in revolutionary theory, special focus falls on the stage of 
political change coincident with the consolidation of power, as opposed to the acquisition of power 
or tactical overthrow of existing power structures. It is at this stage that revolutions often go awry 
or fail to make the lasting changes necessary to secure the perpetuity of the new power structures, 
social group interests, or political ideologies. Revolts, uprisings, coups, riots, and insurgencies 
rarely succeed in fomenting the basic, rapid transformations to existing social structures that 
survive counterinsurgencies; most revolutions thus acquire the historical character of social 
mobilizations without the aimed-for emancipation from oppression. In many cases, this is because 
the revolutionary action has failed to achieve the epistemological break necessary for genuine 
transformation of stable colonial structures. Colonialism, if it is to survive five centuries of 
anticolonial strategies (as it has through its structural iterations in imperialism and neoliberalism) 
requires an element of unarticulated suppression at the deepest interpretive levels that prefigures 
the emergence of the systematic operationalization of the particular oppressions under colonialism. 
Hermeneutic violence performs this counterinsurgent role by preparing the way for cultural 
processes of domination that cannot just overturn, but consolidate European power structures over 
Amerindian and non-European ones. Consolidatory domination at the level of culture thus rests on 
the ability to do more than regulate social acts and practices through laws, prohibitions, and 
normative valuations that discourage individual actions. It rests on establishing hermeneutic power 
over discursive domains and the subsequent regulatory authority to license only those logics and 
counterlogics produced recursively, through self-same systems of interpretation. Cultural 
recursion can then be seen as a process whereby seizing the structures of meaning and interpretive 
stability—as part of securing consolidatory domination—is succeeded by a program of 
establishing social structures that also operate recursively, that is, by translating elements of a 
system into elements recognized through logics external to the system. Cultural recursion is 
important to consolidate colonial domination because, by influencing all parts of the social web of 
interactions, it is able to create the appearance of an objective, value-free world that contradicts 
the lived experience of oppressed peoples, a world behind which a multiplicity of western cultural 
valuations palpitate, actively shaping the kinds of social acts and practices acknowledgeable as 
  16 
“real” in settler colonial culture. It is a cruel reality to inhabit, but it is not our only reality. At its 
most finely tuned stages of development, it creates social contexts where violence can only be 
recognized to the degree that it corresponds with western conceptions of the extra-legal use of 
force, so that, for example, environmental harms to Amerindian waterways are seen as less violent 
than interpersonal harms to a white person or their property. There’s more than one way to kill a 
people, and this fact features prominently in the colonial project.<29> 
“Hermeneutic violence” is an interpretive retooling strategy designed to do something very 
specific in the world and for specific populations. It is limited by design. The point is not to set up 
new epistemic puzzles and citational economies around buzzwords that keep us occupied with the 
master’s myths, but to continue to refocus attention on the systemic violences that are continuously 
marshaled against Indigenous women and women of color, strategically, predictively, and from 
one generation to the next. It is an anti-gaslighting tool to help lift others up, pass the baton, and 
say, ‘I get what’s happening here, and my name will not be counted on your ledger of those 
captured’. When we’re culturally gaslighted away from making moves for substantive structural 
change by the overwhelming citational presence of feminist philosophies that claim to have our 
interests in mind, hermeneutic violence helps us see that Anglophone accounts of hermeneutic 
injustice lack interpretive acumen when it comes to colonial contexts. This is not accidental, as 
settler epistemologies actively promote narratives of terminal Indigeneity and linguistic death 
alongside justice frameworks (Million 2013).<30> From an anticolonial perspective, there’s 
simply no such thing as a “serious hermeneutical disadvantage” that does not inflict epistemic 
injustice, unless, of course, you come from a tradition that a) thinks you can “opt in” or “out” of 
hermeneutical practices as a matter of choice, b) deploys “extant”  (undestroyed) hermeneutical 
resources as the baseline for interpretive understanding, and c) feels free to deploy an arbitrary 
understanding of “hermeneutic” that ignores Indigenous theorist’s prestructural hermeneutical 
commitment to history—something that might come in handy for thinking about how history 
structures the present conditions of knowledge production.<31> But the work of cultural 
gaslighting cannot be done alone, by individual agents as gaslighters; it is produced from the 
bottom up and sustained through the abusive mental ambients that allow people to carry out their 
institutional tasks (of operationalized settler colonial violence) not just with impunity but with 
reward and philosophical acclaim.  
The operationalization of gaslighting as a psychologically reductive interpersonal abuse 
mechanism in contemporary philosophical discourse trades on a pure innocence narrative. It 
provides shield and cover for epistemic complicity that enables other forms of mental and physical 
abuse, not just to individuals, but to communities. It is an act of colonial violence because it delinks 
the necessary association between the land one inhabits and the ambient world one dwells in, 
enabling infrastructural development in culture that operationalizes settler histories as real and 
obfuscates nonsettler realities. Gaslighting, on this view, is a form of epistemic territorial 
expansion that empowers members of dominant communities to claim epistemic space as their 
own, and only their own. Cultural gaslighting shows that epistemological frameworks that claim 
to derive from universal sets of metaphysical assumptions about the nature of knowledge are 
monocultural perspectives supported by structural power relations (see Dotson 2018b). Cultural 
gaslighting thus provides cover for institutions, but also for individuals to Mayflower their way 
through public spaces (and major publications) as a tacit mode of being. Mayflowering, as I use it 
here, is a spatial concept of emplaced social power based on prestructural and structural violences. 
It describes when a member of an interpretive community privileged under settler colonialism 
unproblematically bodies forth and takes up social space through an innocence narrative based on 
  17 
epistemic purity that is structurally enabled. Like the “pilgrims” on the Mayflower, they presume 
a right to foreign spaces by reconceptualizing them as blank territories, both physically and 
epistemically. They’re walking lettered cities (Rama 1996). Their ability to genuinely think they 
are doing good—and to double down on this—is thus predicated on the creation of social 
infrastructures (like law, disciplines, and argumentative systems such as philosophy) that confirm 
that reality and that operate by the structured dispossession of other forms of life.<32>  
Epistemic practices, including those that claim to be liberatory, often recapitulate colonial 
violences, both structural and prestructural. Unlike, for instance, the nuanced structural account of 
epistemic gaslighting by Gaile Pohlhaus (Pohlhaus 2017), mainstream white feminist discourses 
on epistemic injustice and gaslighting illustrate this pattern.<33> What we are being sold as 
philosophical resources to fight oppression are concepts that claim to fix the very thing they are 
culturally responsible for. Recognizing this must lead to an open discussion about the possibilities, 
requirements, and conditions for structural epistemic reparations and cultural revitalization 
projects, which cannot be severed from Indigenous land rematriation and structural reparations for 
the coordinated maldistribution of precarities in women of color’s lives. Epistemic reparations 
need to be thought about in structural terms because liberation does not come about by swapping 
out bad thoughts for good ones or making room for historically marginalized voices while retaining 
the power to make room culturally. As Dotson and Sertler point out, freeing your mind isn’t enough 
when conditions that structure ongoing precarity in the material world remain (Dotson and Sertler 
forthcoming). Because I am interested in what enables these conditions to remain—a kind of 
epistemic impunity that is functionalized across social systems—in the next and final section I 
outline an account of structural innocence that prevails in contemporary accounts of social 
structure. This account keeps us on the hamster wheel of recognition while lasting structural 
transformations that flip the script at the macro level elude us. It should be seen as only one aspect 
of larger forces at play in the intergenerational maintenance of colonial violence.  
 
 
EPISTEMIC IMPUNITY AND THE HIDDEN RULES OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
 
Contemporary accounts of social structure belie the operational existence of a multi-track model 
of social structure that is based on the respecification and enforcement of settler colonial relations 
(Siedlerproduktionsverhältnisse, for the nomenclatural purist) and is co-functional with abstract 
models of universal social structure derived from the German sociological tradition. This tradition 
has cultivated a monocultural view of social structure that works to exonerate the targeted 
maldistribution of harms in settler societies. As a system of self-exoneration, it works to foreclose 
the legitimacy of claims for wealth redistribution or reparation in material, social, and structural 
epistemic terms. For instance, the sociological concept of latent function (and dysfunction) 
prevents structuralist approaches in the social sciences from identifying and tracking the role of 
settler colonial complicity in structuring the maldistribution of social protectives and precarities, 
as latency on both accounts—harm or profit—is always seen as unconscious and unintentional. 
That’s the functional purpose of the definition—that nonspecified consequences of institutional or 
social phenomena, good or bad, are always seen as unintended and having no identifiable 
aggressor. Because this notion predicates definitions of structural violence, it too is seen as having 
no identifiable aggressor. Whom, exactly, does this benefit? This goes beyond the scope of 
methodological racism (Ruíz 2017) in structuring inequality. It is better understood in terms of 
techniques of keeping and asserting social power that structure inequality prestructurally, by 
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suppressing and denying as a matter of automation. This doesn't take away cultural intent, as one 
of the basic features of impunity is that automation does not foreclose complicity but maintains it.  
Epistemic impunity is as common in philosophy as it is in sociology, cultural anthropology, 
ethnography, history, and other official instruments of knowledge production and gatekeeping in 
settler societies, including policy and governance. Structural innocence has become the very 
bedrock of sociologies of knowledge and economies of observation that work both manifestly and 
tacitly to maintain control over social power in settler colonial societies. This idea of structural 
intent is premised on the core notion of elementary functions (or “design”) built into settler social 
structure, where “elementary” denotes processes of self-automation that work to reinforce 
particular structural relations throughout system transformations. The cultural particularity of 
relations selected for reinforcement (and respecification in the transformed structure) is important, 
as these relations rely on metaphysical and epistemological provenances of dominant social 
histories that are maintained through social power and its (political, legal, material, institutional) 
instruments. Not all cultures colonize when given a chance. Stop lying. But there is profit to be 
had by denying this and asking colonized peoples to first disprove settler assumptions about 
cultural universals before acquiescing to the salience of the question of reparations for structured 
and ongoing harms to our communities, for maintaining the conditions under which femicide and 
sexual violence against us can thrive.   
There is individual profit and communal wealth to be gained from maintaining abusive 
ambients that unevenly distribute social precarity across populations. Settler societies use various 
forms of social power to distribute, reproduce, and automate social inequalities (including public 
health precarities and mortality disadvantages) that skew socioeconomic gain continuously toward 
white settler populations and their descendants. While the idea of uneven distribution of harm can 
be found in the social epidemiology literature and public health research on racism, anticolonial 
perspectives are needed to outline the hidden rules of social structure in settler colonial societies. 
These are rules that lead, for example, to epistemic apartheid in legal systems, where the claims of 
some litigants are recognized (and given access to one procedural legal track that affords different 
life chances) whereas others are pathologized and streamlined into another legal track, often a 
dead-end street where the mitigation phase is ceremonial and the punishment predictive. In this 
regard, extending the etiologic period of European colonialism helps to reframe a past historical 
event or static structural determinant to an ongoing and dynamic interpretive process. Colonialism, 
at heart, is an ongoing interpretive process. While it may be strategically helpful to understand 
gaslighting as placing a special focus on the power relations that can affect a person’s trust in their 
own judgments, what is at stake is not just the existential and ontological spectrum of emotional 
abuse sustained but the asymmetrical death toll of some populations over others, consistently, 
predictively, and from one generation to the next. Cultural gaslighting shows how rhetorical 
strategies that name a public grievance yet actively abate relief or remedy of that grievance are 
some of the most commonly taught and preserved interpretive resources in settler epistemic 
systems.<34>  
Coming to terms with the coordinated depths of structured dispossession should not lead to 
impasses for action—it hasn’t for many. The colonial mind game has always been to get us to 
disappear ourselves, to whiten our minds by preference, aspiration, fear, or the terrible calculus of 
bounded choice to survive a moment of terror we did not create, a moment that often spans lives 
and generations. We cannot fall into the trap that survival is acquiescence, as surrender only reifies 
the strength of the relations between specified elements in settler social structures. The work of 
structural respecification oriented towards basic transformations in settler colonial relations is 
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daunting, but we move toward this future with the assertion that proof of harm is no longer on the 
table. We’ve been continuously put in the subordinate position of having to redundantly answer to 
“tell me the story of how I conquered you”<35> in order to get relief for coordinated violences 
that make answerability to conquerors a basic feature of social structure (Rabasa 2011). Half a 
millennium of evidence is enough. Settler social structures guarantee that there will always be 
costs tallied to our resistance and resilience. Despite this, we must continue our work, for there is 
simply no (nonwhitewashed) reason to think the structured abuse, exploitation, and adaptive 
criminalization of our bodies—and the subsequent structural epistemic gaslighting of this 
condition—will stop under settler colonial regimes, nor that the ebb and flow of femicide and 
mortality rates will, unaided, bend toward justice.  
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Notes 
1. Michigan State University occupies the ancestral, traditional, and contemporary Lands of the Anishinaabeg – 
Three Fires Confederacy of Ojibwe, Odawa, and Potawatomi peoples.  
2. It gained particular traction among antiviolence resource organizations as an educational outreach tool for 
intimate partner abuse cycles and, in more clinical settings, as a way to talk about somatic markers, neural pathways, 
and independent psychiatric variables that could help explain impairments in social decision-making among 
individuals facing psychological trauma and/or emotional abuse (Humeny 2014). See also Ahern 2018.  
3. The probabilistic idea of “life chances” (Lebenschancen) comes from German sociologist Max Weber (1864–
1920), yet has a longer conceptual history in German philosophy, melding together theories of human agency from 
the existentialist and Lebensphilosophie tradition (especially Nietzsche) with socially determinist trends in the critique 
of political economy (as in Marx’s Produktionsverhältnisse). Weber’s original notion of the social power behind the 
distribution of life chances in a market economy (the opportunities each person has to access a better material life) 
highlighted “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will 
despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Weber 1947, 53, emphasis added). The 
question of how the socially fated (by design) probabilistically defy the storm and stress of circumstance is not an 
appropriate starting point for thinking about responses to colonial violence and its aftermath. The descriptive tools of 
life chances were never meant to track the strategic maldistribution of life chances of Indigenous people and people 
of color, and need to be rethought as a framework, particularly in public health research.  
4. The argument is not against the existence of the concept of systemic psychological abuse and its possible 
political uses. In fact, useful interpersonal accounts of gaslighting have long existed in women of color feminisms 
with little to no uptake in mainstream feminist discourses. Predictably, when the conditions of heuristic need arose in 
the domestic violence awareness campaigns of the early 1980s, which centered heavily on rescuing the future life 
chances of US white women, the term culled was not from our intellectual works and histories, but from the obscure 
works of a white male British playwright and its preservation in US settler cinema. 
5. This includes experiences of embodiment that are wrongly medicalized as illness, particularly as mental 
pathology in psychiatry. More recently, medical gaslighting has been used to refer to a type of “identity-related abuse” 
observed by healthcare providers between patients and their healthcare proxies, or the parents of transgender children 
and adolescent patients (see Riggs and Bartholomaeus 2018).   
6. This pattern continues in philosophy. For years, progressive movements for racial justice have taken up 
structural analyses of gaslighting to little attention in mainstream analyses of gaslighting as a form of “epistemic 
injustice” (Fricker 2007), with the exception of Pohlhaus 2017.  
7. Design does not simply refer to the identification of patterns of distribution, but intent of distribution effects, as 
in a grand design or master plan. A shift in thinking is needed from individual health “stressors” and bias to active 
structural “antagonists” in this regard. 
8. Not only are these women disproportionately subjected to heightened mortality risk factors, they are often targets 
of state-sponsored epistemic warfare that promote cultures of silence and violent retribution (Fregoso and Bejarano 
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2009). For instance, the increasingly common phenomenon in Latin America of charging women who experience 
miscarriages with aggravated homicide has only recently attracted legal attention.   
9. Russell also introduces us to the helpful notion of structural competency: “physicians must learn what is called 
structural competency: the ability to discern how a host of issues defined clinically as symptoms, attitudes, or diseases  
. . . also represent the downstream implications of upstream decisions about such matters as health care and food 
delivery systems, zoning laws, urban and rural infrastructure, medicalization, or even about the very definitions of 
illness and health” (Metzl 2012, 216, cited in Russell 2016,52). 
10. Particularly when no such comparative data is produced for white women and ARTs. 
11. In her dissertation, “Unbearable Fruit: Black Women’s Experiences with Uterine Fibroids,” sociologist Ranell 
Myles finds that “their experiences negatively impact their quality of life by creating added stress, influencing their 
work lives, and in some cases affecting their ability to conceive and have safe pregnancies” (Myles 2013, 
145).  Although “psychological distress” has been clinically shown to be a risk factor for death from cerebrovascular 
disease (Hamer et al. 2012), medical responses to psychological distress are often pathologized for women racialized 
as nonwhite but remedied with infrastructurally supported, provision-of-care models for women racialized as white.  
12. Research on race itself was severely limited well into the late twentieth century, as race was routinely seen by 
high-ranking scientific journals as an ideological construct unsuited for inclusion in rigorous scientific study design 
and empirical research. This was, of course, methodologically compatible with generations of sexist racist research 
produced in American medicine and particularly in psychiatry. Today, health-disparities research lags significantly 
behind other public interest fields in intersectional analyses, with psychologically driven racial bias dominating the 
literature.    
13. It is incumbent on researchers to anticipate this and to design research with the social forces behind settler 
colonial market economies in mind, revolutionizing methodologies if need be.   
14. Morgan Brinlee is citing a 2014 study by University of Cincinnati Professor John Paul Wright that allowed the 
Trump administration to argue for policies based on the racist assumption that “Black children are just more disruptive 
in the classroom.”  
15. Cf. cases involving the expert testimony of Walter Quijano, state forensic psychiatrist for the state of Texas. 
(see Millhiser 2016; Buck v. Davis)  
16. This in no way minimizes the range of socially legible public outbursts, tears, and emotive somersaults put on 
social display by white people mentally distressed by accusations of racism. In fact, the higher the pay grade, the more 
epistemic resources are often made available to license this behavior. The original claim of differential allostatic load 
remains the same.  
17. Indigenous women fare similarly: they have produced robust scholarship on this phenomenon, yet remain 
peripheralized in western medical measures. Indigenous peoples have developed sophisticated knowledge-practices 
that incorporate wariness of white people with clipboards asking questions since the fifteenth century. The 
underserving of Indigenous populations is thus not due to “small data sets” but structured inattentions to the historical 
conditions for producing medical knowledges about Indigenous populations. (see Deer 2015; Patrick 2016). Scientific 
mystification of violence against Native and Indigenous women changes, of course, with border imaginaries that 
contain populations neatly in settler epistemic terms (island imaginaries), as the rising health literature on Australian 
aboriginal women show.   
19. Today, historical marker #2254 stands at the original site of the Wades’ home. The State of Kentucky has 
rebranded the Wades as “open housing pioneers” who “benefited from the friendship and assistance of Carl and Anne 
Braden” (https://explorekyhistory.ky.gov/items/show/298). This is an example of gaslighting produced by settler 
geoscaping.  
20. Stare decisis refers to the procedural principle that decides which legal arguments have standing based on case 
precedent.    
21. Heston Tobias and Ameil Joseph make a related point, arguing gaslighting is a “historical form” of abuse that 
predates its coinage in settler aesthetics. It has been a technique of communal incapacitation through targeting 
noncompliance in Black communities, such that “gaslighting is part of a systemic, historical process of racism that 
has been used by the police and government organizations to both illegally target people of color and deny complicity 
in racial profiling” (Tobias and Joseph 2018, 22, my emphasis). 
22. As Tuck and Yang note, these can be redeployed by people of color and forced migrants, such as—following 
their logic—displaced victims of human trafficking, war, and global capitalism, including (for illustrative purposes) 
Sonoran women asylum-seekers who may have “stories of colonization” rather than “stories of creation” as part of 
their identity in settler Mexico (as the Mexican state coordinated the reclassification of Indigenous peoples as 
campesinxs under strategic settler configurations of labor and land politics). For a helpful distinction between claims 
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to innocence and claims to pure innocence, which are untenable in late-stage, settler-colonial, capitalist societies given 
the historical functioning of the settler-slave-Native triad, see Dotson 2018a. I follow Dotson on this point.  
23. This is not only because one has it, but because of inhabiting social structures that nonaccidentally recognize 
these forms of capital but not others as social protectives or wealth. Understanding the structural relations behind 
motivations for settler moves to innocence is critical for recognizing the violent precarities that are structured to shape 
the aspirational experiences of people of color and racialized immigrants resettling on stolen lands, and whose own 
lands have often been stolen and/or removed from possibility of return.   
24. The idea of mobilization without emancipation comes from late twentieth-century feminist interpretations of 
Latin American revolutionary theory, particularly of the Nicaraguan and Cuban revolutions (cf. Randall 1983; 
AMNLAE 1984; Molyneux 1985; Ariza and de Oliveira 1999; Viterna 2005; Garzón et al. 2014). Indeed, a great deal 
of feminist anticolonial approaches to structural oppressions (including lengthy treatments of ideological forces and 
epistemic oppressions responsible for thwarting women’s liberation) arose out of these literatures, to little uptake in 
the global North. Along with feminist Zapatismo, it is these literatures that form my basic conceptions of social 
transformations, the predictive nature of counterrevolutionary forces, permutations of cultural power, and processes 
of functionalization. Stability across transformations is one of the lasting legacies of Latin American revolutions 
(Winn 1989; Gleijeses 1992); feminist interpretations of these histories, however, have been critical in dismantling 
deterministic accounts of cultural structural dependency on the global North and envisioning paths for strategic 
responses to counterinsurgency (Viterna 2013; Kampwirth 2004).     
25. Historically, one or two have always gone free—in fact some must always go free and in a statistically 
significant way for settler science to see, record, and study the paradox when it ebbs, thereby constructing the illusory 
puzzle of freedom to keep us busy as political theorists.  
26. For example, citing Virginia Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own rather than Gertrude Mossell’s A Lofty Study helps 
relieve pressure to enter the actual work and voices of women of color into the citational economy of the academy. A 
hundred women of color and Indigenous women can say it, but when a structurally privileged white woman says it, it 
becomes a potential cottage industry by design, irrespective of who the writer is. In fact, I fully expect terms like 
cultural gaslighting and hermeneutic violence to be unproblematically attributed to or associated with a white 
academic in the near future, or to be foreclosed by homologous terms that depoliticize or produce opposite effects (cf. 
the notion of academic mainstreaming of intersectionality in Ruíz 2017).    
27. It enables journal referees to ask to have the term “settler colonial culture” explained to them, often with the 
presumption that no such thing exists. It is just another version of knowledge-production based on Native informancy. 
It takes the form: “Prove to us we’re bad, because we’re inherently good,” and where proof of harm not indication of 
harm is the baseline for motivating corrective action. Today, a slew of cutting-edge and important work is being done 
across the natural and social sciences to prove people of color are disproportionately harmed by policy, practice, and 
bias, but with the legitimating framework of unproven harm as the baseline of study design. Study design does not yet 
foreground the inverse, proof that harm isn’t being done to our communities and lives. This would constitute corrective 
action and better align with the realities of the subjects that methodological positivism claims to be tracking. The gains 
may be short-term, but they are necessary.  
28. This power is wielded quite widely on a structural scale that has direct economic benefits and indirect benefits 
as social capital that are often economized for social mobility.  It constitutes the nonaccidental accumulation of 
interpretive wealth and capital as a form of indirect intergenerational wealth transmissions between specific 
populations and their descendants. It is a form of wealth that performs as safety nets of social capital, yet (predictively) 
remain unaccounted for in studies of class wealth (Ruíz unpublished).   
29. Consolidatory domination and cultural recursion help us see how interpretive familiarity under colonialism is 
achieved, not by growing into a specific sociohistorical context held together by social acts and practices, but by the 
simultaneous erasure and repression of an alternative reference point that preconditions the emergence of western 
interpretive frameworks, acts, and practices. This productive repression is performed by hermeneutic violence. It is 
not a reflective political maneuver; it is the expressive outcome of western conceptual orthodoxies (such as substance 
ontology, hierarchical binaries, exclusionary logics) that are particularly adept at producing a worldview that structures 
social processes through agonism and domination, where what perseveres unchanged through struggle and change has 
its existence recognized as real. That’s not a universal feature of human existence; it is the metaphysical provenance 
of western culture since the Greek atomists, and essential to the development of Greco-Roman slave law.   
30. As one professor (one of Gadamer’s students) in graduate school once told me, “real Indigenous cultures are 
dead. All there is left are pastiches. Rain dances in high school gymnasiums.” It didn’t work. I saw how the 
whitewashing of hermeneutic resources (including historiography) for the purposes of wielding monocultural 
authority over the instruments of knowledge-production is one of the oldest tools of dispossession in the academy. 
Retaining monocultural control of institutional and infrastructural mechanisms such as law, history, and education 
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that trade on whitewashed hermeneutical resources is critical to the formation of interpretive power, which discloses 
only those domains of intelligibility that recognize colonial cultural formations as the prereflective baseline for 
meaning, language, and social communication. The goal was not to get me to believe or adjudicate the claim of 
Indigenous death, but to foreclose the possibility of epistemic disobedience based, for instance, on lived knowledge 
of Indigenous cultures, memories that outlive my lifespan, or simply the politics of refusal (see Simpson 2007; Dotson 
2018a). 
31. There’s a deeper value inversion at play here, since monocultural epistemologies actually have the serious 
hermeneutical disadvantage when compared to the vast majority of the world’s oppressed peoples who can track 
multiple cultural levels of salience.  But this limitation is unsupported by the social infrastructures of settler culture.  
32. Mayflowering is common in the discourses of ally culture, whether humanitarians, political liberals, white 
feminists, or structurally privileged peoples from colonized contexts who unproblematically resettle to Indigenous 
lives and lands, holding onto intergenerational wealth or aspirations to restored settler status through the social capital 
of assimilative recognition. (This is especially true of white and white-facing mestizx diasporic Latin Americans who 
expected to inherit privileged socioeconomic statuses in their countries of origin, and whose deflated social and 
economic standing as “Latinx” in the US was interiorized to enable Mayflowering, but also deep anti-Black racism, 
anti-Indigenous, sexist racism and complicity with US white settlers and their institutions.) What is imperial in the 
interpretive asymmetry enacted through Mayflowering is more than an organized failure to recognize that their 
embodied can-do-ness takes place on stolen lands; it helps to organize the automation of structural violence. 
Mayflowerers are often some of the most virtued and principled humanists in the academy. Mayflowering is thus one 
reason to reject ethical views in social epistemology that tackle social injustices through the monocultural lenses of 
settler-imperial culture.  
33. Social epistemology under white feminisms has become the new clipboard-carrying ethnographer making the 
rounds on Native lands, the imperial social anthropologist who records as a matter of data, taking notes, assuming 
answers are theirs to interpret as truth, lies, or false belief and report back as objective knowledge. With universalism 
as a methodology, conquest is always near. That is why some prefer to fictionalize our lives to talk about them 
indirectly, so that you don’t have to talk about actual hermeneutical injustices to, say, the actual women who have 
given testimonio of injustices, sexual violence, and femicide, for centuries. The literature on the epistemology of 
testimony is long and varied in Latin America, but to the global North, it might as well never have been written.  
34. Precarity is always a double-edged sword that requires structural countermoves to address. Since reproducing 
conditions of psychic exhaustion is part of the design of settler social structures, the trap set up is to respond by giving 
up on all empirical work and applied research, particularly on research that gives socially legitimate legal measure 
and cultural weight to communal impacts of trafficking, battery, femicide, rape, and associated gender-based 
violences. The fact remains that we need lawyers who won’t advocate against our interests through cultural 
incompetence and doctors who won’t get us killed while doing nothing legally recognized as negligent, doctors who 
have “structural competence” (Russell 2016). We need structural competence across the board: policies that address 
regulatory lacunae and public servants who call racist policies and practices to task, even under a settler governance 
structure that on the long view skews advantage toward white settler populations and their descendants. Strategically, 
we can marshal moves that force policies and laws to do what section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 did, which 
was to shift the burden on states to first prove that proposed changes to voting procedures were not racist before being 
enacted. It had a nontrivial positive impact on the lives of many people of color in the US, which is why it was 
foreseeable that it would be dismantled. But we can also stay ahead of predictive epistemic precarity by shifting the 
debate altogether and directing our citational economies to Indigenous social science research that doesn’t rely on the 
interpretive assumptions of settler credibility economies, yet can move tactically within them to address community 
needs brought by structured harm (Walter and Andersen 2016). When considering adverse racial climates in academia 
(Williams 2019), flip the script. Make them keep up for a change.  
35. And with metaphysically impoverished settler languages woefully unequipped for little more than 
prespecifying subject–object distinctions primed for regulating commercial transitions in settler market economies. 
There are other ways of being, living, and relating that the grammatical arrangements of settler languages do not 
enliven.  
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